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The operationalization of general hypotheses versus the
discovery of empirical laws in Psychology
Stéphane Vautier
Université de Toulouse
Abstract
Psychology students learn to operationalize `general hypotheses' as a
paradigm of scientiﬁc Psychology: relatively vague ideas result in an
attempt to reject the null hypothesis in favour of an alternative hypothesis,
a so-called research hypothesis, which operationalizes the general idea.
Such a practice turns out to be particularly at odds with the discovery of
empirical laws. An empirical law is deﬁned as a nomothetic gap emerging
from a reference system of the form Ω × M(X) × M(Y), where Ω is a
set of events or dated objects for which some states in the set M(Y) are
hypothetically impossible given some initial conditions depicted in the set
M(X). This approach allows the knowledge historian to carefully scrutinize
descriptive and nomothetic advances in contemporary empirical Psychology.
Résumé
L'enseignement de la méthodologie scientiﬁque en Psychologie confère un
rôle paradigmatique à l'opérationnalisation des "hypothèses générales" : une
idée sans rapport précis à l'observation concrète se traduit par la tentative de
rejeter une hypothèse statistique nulle au proﬁt d'une hypothèse alternative,
dite de recherche, qui opérationnalise l'idée générale. Cette démarche s'avère
particulièrement inadaptée à la découverte de lois empiriques. Une loi em-
pirique est déﬁnie comme un trou nomothétique émergeant d'un référentiel de
la forme Ω×M(X)×M(Y), où Ω est un ensemble d'événements ou d'objets
datés dont certains états dans l'ensemble M(Y) sont par hypothèse impos-
sibles étant données certaines conditions initiales décrites dans l'ensemble
M(X). Cette approche permet de préciser le regard que l'historien des con-
naissances peut porter sur les avancées descriptives et nomothétiques de la
Psychologie empirique contemporaine.
This article is the result of the author's need to elaborate on the persistent dissatisfaction he
feels with the methodology of scientiﬁc research in Psychology, and more precisely with his
perception of the way in which it is taught. It would indeed be presumptuous to present the
following criticism as being a criticism of the methodology of scientiﬁc research in Psychology
as a whole, since the latter is a notion which is too all-encompassing in its scope to serve
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as a precise description of the diversity of research practice in this vast ﬁeld. The source
of this dissatisfaction is to be found in what Reuchlin (1992) calls the `distance' between
`general theory' and a `speciﬁc, falsiﬁable hypothesis' (p. 32). A certain form of academism
shapes the approach to scientiﬁc research in Psychology according to a three-stage process
for the formulation of hypotheses (e.g., Charbonneau, 1988). When they write the report
of an empirical study, researchers in Psychology must supply the grounds for their research
by introducing a so-called general (or theoretical) hypothesis, then show how they have
tested this hypothesis by restating it as a so-called operational (or research) hypothesis.
In principle, this restatement should involve data analysis, ﬁnalised by testing at least one
inferential statistical hypothesis, the so-called null hypothesis.
As a socially regulated procedure, the sequencing of theoretical, operational and null
hypotheses  which we refer to here as operationalization  may not pose scientiﬁc problems
to researchers who are mainly concerned with adhering to a socio-technical norm. The sense
of dissatisfaction arises when this desire for socio-technical compliance is considered in the
light of the hope (albeit an admittedly pretentious or naïve hope) of discovering one or more
empirical laws, i.e. demonstrating at least one, corroborated general empirical statement
(Vautier, 2011).
With respect to the discovery of empirical laws, operationalization may be charac-
terised as a paradigm, based on a `sandwich' system, whose workings prove to be strikingly
ineﬀective. The `general hypothesis' (the uppermost layer of the `sandwich' system) is not
the statement of an empirical law, but a pre-referential statement, i.e. a statement whose
empirical signiﬁcance has not (yet) been determined. The null hypothesis test (the lower
layer of the `sandwich') binds the research procedure to a narrow, pragmatic decision-making
approach amid uncertainty  rejection or acceptance of the null hypothesis  which is not
germane to the search for empirical laws if the null hypothesis is not a general statement
in the strict sense of the term, i.e. held to be true for all the elements in a given set. Be-
tween the external layers of the `sandwich' system lies the psychotechnical and statistical
core of the operationalization paradigm, i.e. the production of psychological measurements
to which the variables required for the formulation of the operational hypothesis are linked.
Again, the claim here is not that this characterisation of research procedure in Psychology
applies absolutely universally; however, operationalization as outlined above does appear to
be suﬃciently typical of a certain orthodoxy to warrant a thorough critical analysis.
This paradigm governs an approach which is destined to establish a favourable view of
`general hypotheses' inasmuch as they have psychotechnical and inferential support. How-
ever, the ideological interest of these statements does not automatically confer them with
nomothetic import. Consequently, one cannot help wondering whether the rule of opera-
tionalization does not in fact serve to prevent those who practise it from ever discerning
a possible historical failure of orthodox Psychology to discover its own empirical laws, by
training the honest researcher not to hope for the impossible. After all, we are unlikely to
I wish to express my thanks to Nadine Matton and Éric Raufaste for their helpful comments on a previous
version of this article. This work was funded in part by the ANR-07-JCJC-0065-01 programme. Correspon-
dence about this article should be sent to Stéphane Vautier, Université de Toulouse, OCTOGONE-CERPP,
Pavillon de la Recherche, 5 allées A. Machado, 31058 Toulouse Cedex 9, France. E-mail: vautier@univ-
tlse2.fr.
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worry about failing to obtain something which we were not looking for in the ﬁrst place.
We shall see that an empirical law consists precisely of stating an empirical impossibility,
i.e. a partially deterministic falsiﬁable statement. As a result, we have inevitably come
to question psychological thought as regards the reasons and consequences of an apodictic
approach to probabilistic treatment of the empirical phenomena which it is investigating.
This article comprises four major parts. First of all, we shall illustrate operational-
ization on the basis of an example put forward by Fernandez and Catteeuw (2001). Next,
we shall identify two logical and empirical diﬃculties which arise from this paradigm and
demonstrate that they render it unsuitable for the discovery of empirical laws, then detail
the logical structure of these laws. Lastly, we shall identify some methodological guidelines
which are compatible with an inductive search for partial determinisms.
An example of operationalization: smoking cessation and anxiety
Fernandez and Catteeuw (2001) put forward the following sequence (p. 125):
General hypothesis: undergoing smoking cessation tends to increase anxiety in
smokers rather than reduce it.
↓
Operational hypothesis: smokers undergoing smoking cessation are more prone
to anxiety than non-cessation smokers.
↓
Null hypothesis: there is no diﬀerence between anxiety scores for smokers un-
dergoing smoking cessation and non-cessation smokers.
This example can be expanded so as to oﬀer more opportunities to engage with the crit-
ical exercise. There is no diﬃculty in taking Fernandez and Catteeuw (2001) operational
hypothesis as a `general hypothesis'. Their formulation speciﬁes neither the empirical (nom-
inal) meaning of the notion of smoking cessation, nor the empirical (ordinal or quantitative)
signiﬁcance of the notion of anxiety, even though it makes reference to the ordinal operator
more prone to anxiety than; lastly, the noun smokers signiﬁes only an indeﬁnite number of
people who smoke.
The researcher may have given herself/himself a set of criteria which is suﬃcient to
decide whether, at the moment when they examines an individual, the person is a smoker or
not, and if they is a smoker, another set of criteria suﬃcient to decide whether or not they
is undergoing smoking cessation. These sets of criteria allow the values for two nominal
variables to be deﬁned, the ﬁrst attributing the value of smoker or non-smoker, and the
second, which is conditional on the status of `smoker', attributing the value of undergoing
cessation or non-cessation. However, the statistical deﬁnition of the `undergoing cessation'
variable requires a domain, i.e. elements assigned a value according to its codomain, the
(descriptive) reference system of the variable: {undergoing cessation, non-cessation}. The
researcher may circumscribe the domain to pairs (smoker, examination date) which they
already has obtain or will obtain during the course of their study, and thus deﬁne a so-called
independent nominal variable.
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They then needs to specify the function which assigns an anxiety score for each
(smoker, examination date) pair, in order to deﬁne the `anxiety score' statistical variable,
taken as the dependent variable. The usual solution for specifying such a function consists
in using the answers to an anxiety questionnaire to determine this score, according to a
numerical coding rule for the responses to the items on the questionnaire. Such procedures,
in which standardised observation of a verbal behaviour is associated with the numerical
coding of responses, constitute one of the fundamental contributions of psychotechnics (or
psychological testing) to Psychology; it enables anxiety means conditional on the values
of the independent variable to be calculated, whence the operational hypothesis: smokers
undergoing smoking cessation are more anxious than non-cessation smokers.
The operational hypothesis constitutes a descriptive proposition whose validity can
easily be examined. However, to the extent that she/he considers their sample of observa-
tions to be a means of testing a general hypothesis, the researcher must also demonstrate
that the mean diﬀerence observed is signiﬁcant, i.e. rejects the null hypothesis of the equal-
ity of the means for the statistical populations composed of the two types of smokers, using
a probabilistic procedure selected from the available range of inferential techniques, for in-
stance Student's t-test for independent samples. Only then can the operational hypothesis,
considered in the light of the two statistical populations, acquire the status of an alternative
hypothesis with respect to the null hypothesis.
Now, let us restate the sequence of hypotheses put forward by Fernandez and Catteeuw
(2001) thus:
General hypothesis: smokers undergoing smoking cessation are more anxious
than non-cessation smokers
↓
Operational hypothesis: given a pair of variables (`undergoing cessation', `anxi-
ety score'), mean anxiety conditional on the undergoing cessation value is greater
than mean anxiety conditional on the non-cessation value.
↓
Null hypothesis: the two conditional means are equal.
Operationalization criticised
The example which we have just developed is typical of operationalization in Psy-
chology, irrespective of the experimental or correlational nature (Cronbach, 1957, 1975) of
the study. In this section, we make two assertions by dealing with the operationalization
approach in reverse: (i) the empirical relevance of the test of the null hypothesis is indeter-
minate (ii) the statistical fact of a mean diﬀerence has no general empirical import.
The myth of the statistical population
To simplify the discussion, let us suppose that the researcher tests the null hypothesis
of the equality of two means using Student's t procedure. The issue at stake in the test from
a socio-technical point of view is that by qualifying the diﬀerence observed as a signiﬁcant
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diﬀerence, the cherished notation "p < .05" or "p < .01" may be included in a research
paper. The null hypothesis test has been the subject of purely statistical criticisms (e.g.,
Krueger, 2001; Nickerson, 2000) and it is not within the scope of this paper to draw up
an inventory of these criticisms. In the empirical perspective under examination here, the
problem is that this type of procedure is nothing more than a rhetorical device, insofar as
the populations to which the test procedure is applied remain virtual in nature.
In practice, the researcher knows how to deﬁne their conditional variables on the
basis of pairs: (smoker undergoing cessation, examination date) and (non-cessation smoker,
examination date), assembled by her/him through observation. But what is the signiﬁcance
of the statistical population to which the inferential exercise makes reference? If we consider
the undergoing cessation value, for example, how should the statistical population of the
(smoker undergoing cessation/examination date) pairs be deﬁned? Let us imagine a survey
which would enable the anxiety score for all the human beings on the planet with the status
of `smoker undergoing smoking cessation' to be known on a certain date each month in the
interval of time under consideration. We would then have as many populations as we have
monthly surveys; we could then consider grouping together all of these monthly populations
to deﬁne the population of observations relating to the `cessation' status. There is not
one single population, but rather a number of virtual populations. The null hypothesis is
therefore based on a mental construct. As soon as this is deﬁned more precisely, questions
arise as to its plausibility and the interest of the test. Indeed, why should a survey supply
an anxiety variable whose conditional means, subject to change, are identical?
Ultimately, it appears that the null hypothesis test constitutes a decision-making
procedure with respect to the plausibility of a hypothesis devoid of any determined empirical
meaning. The statistical inference used in the operationalization system is an odd way of
settling the issue of generality: it involves deciding whether the diﬀerence between observed
means may be generalised, even if the empirical meaning of this generality has not been
established.
The myth of the average smoker
The diﬀerence between the two anxiety means may be interpreted as the diﬀerence
between the degree of anxiety of the average smoker undergoing cessation and the degree of
anxiety of the average non-cessation smoker, which poses two problems. Firstly, the discrete
nature of the anxiety score contains a logical dead-end, i.e. the use of an impossibility to
describe something which is possible. Let us assume an anxiety questionnaire comprising
ﬁve items with answers scored 0, 1, 2 or 3, such that the score attributed to any group
of 5 responses will fall within the sequence of natural numbers (0, 1, . . . , 15). A mean
score of 8.2 may indeed `summarise' a set of scores, but cannot exist as an individual score.
Consequently, should we wish to use a mean score to describe a typical smoker, it must be
recognised that such a smoker is not possible and therefore not plausible. As a result, the
diﬀerence between the two means cannot be used to describe the diﬀerence in degrees of
anxiety of the typical smokers, unless it is admitted that a typical smoker is in fact a myth.
Let us now assume that the numerical coding technique enables a continuous variable
to be deﬁned by the use of so-called analogue response scales. The score of any smoker is by
deﬁnition composed of the sum of two quantities, the mean score plus the deviation from
the mean, the latter expressing the fact that the typical smoker is replaced in practice by
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a particular specimen of the statistical population, whose variable nature is assumed to be
random  without it appearing necessary to have empirical grounds for the probability space
on which this notion is based. In these conditions, the mean score constitutes a parameter,
whose speciﬁcation is an empirical matter inasmuch as the statistical population is actually
deﬁned. An empirical parameter is not, however, the same thing as an empirical law.
Formalisation of an empirical law
According to the nomothetic perspective, scientiﬁc ambition consists in discovering
laws, i.e. general implications.1 A general implication is a statement in the following form
∀ x ∈ A, p(x)⇒ q(x), (1)
which reads thus for any x of A, if p(x) then q(x), where x is any component of a given
set A, and p(·) and q(·) are singular statements. This formalisation applies without any
diﬃculty to any situation in which the researcher has a pair of variables (X, Y ), from a
domain Ωn = {ωi, i = 1, . . . , n}, whose elements ωi are pairs (person, observation date).
The codomain of the independent variable X is a descriptive reference system of initial
conditions M(X) = {xi, i = 1, . . . , k}, whilst the dependent variable, Y , speciﬁes a value
reference system,M(Y ) = {yi, i = 1, . . . , l}, the eﬀective observation of which depends, by
hypothesis, on the independent conditions. Thus, the ontological substrate of an empirical
law is the observation reference system Ω×M(X)×M(Y ), where Ω ⊃ Ωn is an extrapolation
of Ωn: any element of Ω is, as a matter of principle, assigned a unique value inM(X)×M(Y )
by means of the function (X, Y ).
Two comments arise from this deﬁnition. Firstly, as noted by Popper (1959), [natural
laws] do not assert that something exists or is the case; they deny it (p. 48). In other words,
they state a general ontological impossibility in terms of Ω ×M(X) ×M(Y ): a law may
indeed by formulated by identifying the initial conditions α(X) ⊂ M(X) for which a non-
empty subset β(Y ) ⊂M(Y ) exists such that,
∀ ω ∈ Ω, X(ω) ∈ α(X)⇒ Y (ω) ∈ β(Y ). (2)
This formulation excludes the possibility ofX(ω) ∈ α(X) and Y (ω) ∈ {β(Y ) being observed,
where {β(Y ) designates the complementary set β(Y ) with respect to M(Y ). Making a
statement in the form of (2) amounts to stating a general empirical fact in terms of Ωn, and
an empirical law in terms of Ω, by inductive generalisation. This law can be falsiﬁed, simply
by exhibiting an example of what is said to be impossible in order to falsify it. The general
nature of the statement stems from the quantiﬁer ∀ and its empirical limit is found in the
extension of Ω. The law may then be corroborated or falsiﬁed. If it is corroborated, it is
possible to measure its degree of corroboration by the number of observations applying to
it, i.e. by the cardinality of the equivalence class formed by the antecedents of α(X)  the
class is noted ClΩn/X [α(X)].
1This is a more general and radical restatement of the deﬁnition given by Piaget (1970) of the notion of
laws. For him laws designate relatively constant quantitative relations which may be expressed in the form
of mathematical functions, general fact or ordinal relationships [...,] structural analyses, etc. which are
expressed in ordinary language or in more or less formalised language (logic, etc.) (p. 17).
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The second comment relates to the notion of partial determinism. The mathematical
culture passed on through secondary school teaching familiarises honest researchers with
the notion of numerical functions y = f(x), which express a deterministic law, i.e. that x
being given, y necessarily has a point value. If the informative nature of the law is envis-
aged in negative terms (Dubois & Prade, 2003), the necessity of the point is deﬁned as the
impossibility of its complement. In the ﬁeld of humanities (Granger, 1995), seeking total
determinisms appears futile, but this does not imply that there is no general impossibility in
Ω×M(X)×M(Y ) and therefore no partial determinism. The fact that partial determinism
may not have a utility value from the point of view of social or medical decision-making
engineering has nothing to do with its fundamental scientiﬁc value. The subject of nomo-
thetic research therefore appears in the form of a 'gap' in a descriptive reference system,
this gap being theoretically interpreted as the eﬀect of a general ontological impossibility.
This is why in teaching, a methodology to support the nomothetic goal of training student
researchers to `search for the impossible' is called for.
How to seek the impossible
Discovery of a gap in the descriptive reference system involves the discovery of a
general empirical fact, from which an empirical law is inferred by extending the set of
observations Ωn to an unknown phenomenological ﬁeld Ω ⊃ Ωn (e.g. future events). A
general empirical fact makes sense only with reference to the descriptive reference system
M(X)×M(Y ). Practically speaking, dependent and independent variables are multivariate.
Let X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xp) be a series of p independent variables and M(X) the reference
system ofX ;M(X) is the Cartesian product of the p reference systemsM(Xi), i = 1, · · · , p.
Similarly, let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yq) be a series of q dependent variables andM(Y) the reference
system of Y. The descriptive reference system of the study is therefore
M [(X, Y)] = M(X)×M(Y) = M(X1)×M(X2)× · · · ×M(Xp)
×M(Y1)× · · · ×M(Yq).
(3)
Thus the contingency table (the rows of which represent the multivariate values of X, and
the columns the multivariate values of Y) can be deﬁned. Observation readings are then
carried out so that the cells in the contingency table are gradually ﬁlled in... or remain
empty.
Two cases must be distinguished here. The ﬁrst corresponds to the situation in which
the researcher is completely ignorant of what is happening in their observation reference
system, in other words, they does not have any prior observations. They therefore has to
carry out some kind of survey in order to learn more. Knowing what is happening in the
reference system means knowing the frequency of each possible state. It does not involve
calling on the notion of probability (the latter being ﬁrmly in the realm of mathematical
mythology) since it would involve knowing the limit of the frequency of each cell in the
contingency table as the number of observations (n) tends towards inﬁnity.
A nomothetic gap arises when there is at least one empty cell in at least one row of
the contingency table, when the margin of the row (or rows) is well above the cardinality of
M(Y). It is possible to identify all the gaps in the reference system only if its cardinality
is well below the cardinality of Ωn, n. This empirical consideration sheds light on a spe-
ciﬁc epistemological drawback in Psychology: not only are its descriptive reference systems
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not given naturally, as emphasised by Danziger (1990),2 but in addition the depth of con-
structible reality is such that its cardinality may be gigantic  so much so that discussing
what is happening in an observation reference system cannot be achieved in terms of sensible
intuition. The fact is that the socio-technical norms which shape the presentation of the ob-
servation techniques used in empirical studies do not refer either to the notion of descriptive
reference system or the necessity of plotting the cardinality card[M(X)×M(Y)] against the
cardinality of the set of observations, card(Ωn) = n. If the quotient card[M(X)×M(Y)]/n
is not much lower than 1, planning to carry out an exhaustive examination of the nomothetic
gaps in the descriptive reference system is unfeasible. This does not prevent the researcher
from working on certain initial conditions α(X), but in such cases it must nonetheless be
established that dividing the number of values of M(Y) by the cardinality of the class
ClΩn/X[α(X)] of antecedents of α(X) in Ωn gives a result which is far less than 1.
Let us now present the second case, for which it is assumed that the researcher has
been lucky enough to observe the phenomenon of a gap, whose 'coordinates' in the descrip-
tive reference system of the study are [α(X), {β(Y)]. The permanent nature of this gap
constitutes a proper general hypothesis. This hypothesis should be tested using a targeted
observation strategy. Indeed, accumulating observations in Ω is of interest from the point
of view of the hypothesis if these observations are such that:
• X(ω) ∈ α(X), in which case we seek to verify that Y(ω) ∈ β(Y),
• Y(ω) ∈ {β(Y ), in which case we seek to verify that X(ω) ∈ {α(X).
This approach to observation is targeted, and indeed makes sense, in that it focuses on a
limited number of states: the researcher knows exactly what they is looking for. It is the
very opposite of blindly reproducing an experimental plan or survey plan.
When a counterexample is discovered, i.e. ωe exists such that X(ωe) ∈ α(X) and
Y(ωe) ∈ {β(Y), this observation falsiﬁes the general hypothesis. The researcher can then
decide either to reject the hypothesis or to defend it. If they decides to defend it, they
may restrict the set of conditions α(X), or try to ﬁnd a variable Xp+1 which modulates
veriﬁcation of the rule. Formally speaking, this modulating variable is such that there is a
strict non-empty subset of M(Xp+1)  let this be γ(Xp+1)  such that:
∀ ω ∈ Ω, [X(ω) ∈ α(X) and Xp+1(ω) ∈ γ(Xp+1)]⇒ Y(ω) ∈ β(Y). (4)
Irrespective of how they revises the original hypothesis, they will have to restrict its domain
of validity with respect to the  implicit  set of possible descriptive reference systems. A
major consequence of revising the law by expanding the descriptive reference system of initial
conditions is resetting the corroboration counter, since the world being explored has been
given an additional descriptive dimension: this is the reference system Ω×M(X1)×M(Y),
where X1 = (X, Xp+1).
Example
Without it being necessary to develop the procedure presented here in its entirety, we
can illustrate it using the example of smokers' anxiety. The problem consists of restating the
2But in terms of truth, scientiﬁc psychology does not deal with natural objects. It deals with test scores,
evaluation scales, response distributions, series lists, and countless other items which the researcher does not
discover but rather constructs with great care. Conjectures about the world, whatever they may be, cannot
escape from this universe of artefacts (p. 2).
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'general hypothesis' as a statement which is (i) general, properly speaking, as understood in
(1) , and (ii) falsiﬁable. We may proceed in two stages. Firstly, it is not necessary to talk
in terms of reference systems to produce a general statement. Expressing the problem in
terms of the diﬀerence between two means is not relevant to what is being sought; however,
the idea according to which any smoker undergoing cessation becomes more anxious may be
examined, along the lines of the 'general hypothesis' described by Fernandez and Catteeuw
(2001). This idea is pre-referential inasmuch as we are unable to deﬁne a smoker, a smoker
undergoing cessation, or a person who is becoming more anxious.
Since we cannot claim to be able to actually settle these issues of deﬁnition, we shall
use certain deﬁnitions for the purposes of convenience. Let U be a population of people and
T a population of dates on which they were observed. Let Ωn be a subset of U ×T ×T such
that, for any triplet ω = (u, t1, t2), u is known on dates t1 and t2 in terms of their status
as:
• a non-smoker, a smoker undergoing cessation or a non-cessation smoker
• and their state of anxiety, for instance with reference to a set of clinical signs, of
which the person is asked to evaluate the intensity on date t, using a standard `state-anxiety'
questionnaire.
It can be noted that the set Ωn is a ﬁnite, non-virtual set, in that a person u whose smoker
status is not known on date t1 or t2 for example, constitutes a triplet which does not belong
to this set. According to our approach to the statistical population, it is not necessary for
the observations to be the result of applying a speciﬁc random sampling technique. Since Ωn
constitutes a set of known observations from the point of view of the descriptive reference
system, it is a numbered set, to which new observations can be added over time; whence the
notation Ωn (read "j-mat"), where n stands for the cardinality of the most recent update
to the set of observations.
We can then deﬁne the following variables X and Y, from the subset P of Ωn ,
which includes the triplets (u, t1, t2) such that t2 − t1 = d, where d is a transition time
(e.g. 2 days). The variable X matches any component of P with an image in M(X) =
{nf, f1, f2} × {nf, f1, f2}, where nf , f1 and f2 signify `non-smoker', `non-cessation
smoker' and `smoker undergoing cessation' respectively. Let us call α(X) the subset of
M(X) including all the pairs of values ending in f2 which do not begin with f2 and take
an element p ∈ P: the proposition `X(p) ∈ α(X)' means that in the period during which
they was observed, person u had been undergoing smoking cessation for two days whereas
she/he has not been before.3
The dependent variable Y must now be deﬁned. Let us assume that for any sign of
anxiety, we have a description on an ordinal scale (i.e., a Likert scale). Anxiety can then be
described as a multivariate state varying within a descriptive reference system A. Consider
A × A; in this set a subset β(Y) can be deﬁned which includes changes in states deﬁned
as a worsening of the state of anxiety. The variable Y can then be deﬁned, which, for each
p ∈ P, corresponds to a state in M(Y). The proposition 'Y(p) ∈ β(Y)' signiﬁes that
in the period during which they was observed, person u became more anxious. Lastly, the
3It may be noted that an observation p such that X(p) = (nf, f2) is not plausible; this relates to the
question of the deﬁnition of the state of cessation and does not aﬀect the structure of the logic.
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general hypothesis can be formulated in terms which ensure that it may be falsiﬁed:
∀ p ∈ P, X(p) ∈ α(X)⇒ Y(p) ∈ β(Y). (5)
We have just illustrated an apparently hypothetical-deductive approach; but in fact
it is an exploratory procedure if the community is not aware of any database enabling a
nomothetic gap to be identiﬁed. Let us assume that the work of the researcher leads to the
provision of a database Ω236 for the community and that sets α(X) and β(Y) are deﬁned
after the fact, such that at least one general fact may be stated. The community with
an interest in the general fact revealed by this data may seek new supporting or falsifying
observations in order to help update the database.
If a researcher ﬁnds an individual v, with q = (v, tv1, tv2) and tv2 − tv1 = d, such
that X(q) ∈ α(X) and Y(q) ∈ {β(Y), this means that there is a smoker who has been
undergoing cessation for two days, whose anxiety has not worsened. Let us assume that the
researcher investigates whether the person was already very anxious; they may suggest that
rule (5) should be revised so as to exclude people whose initial clinical state corresponds to
certain values in the reference system A. This procedure usually consists in restricting the
scope of validity of the general hypotheses.
Discussion
Operationalization in Psychology consists in restating a pre-referential proposition in
order to enable the researcher to test a statistical null hypothesis, the rejection of which
enables the `general hypothesis' to be credited with a certain degree of acceptability.4 Using
an example taken from Fernandez and Catteeuw (2001), we have shown that the aim of such
a procedure is not the discovery of empirical laws, i.e. the discovery of nomothetic gaps in
a reference system. We shall discuss two consequences of our radical approach to seeking
empirical laws in an observation reference system Ω ×M(X) ×M(Y). The ﬁrst relates to
the methodology for updating the state of knowledge in a ﬁeld of research, the second to
the probabilistic interpretation of accumulated observations.
The state of knowledge in a given ﬁeld of research can be apprehended in practical
terms by means of a list of m so-called scientiﬁc publications. Let us call this set composed
of specialist literature Lm and let li be an element in this list. The knowledge historian
can then ask the following question: does text li allow an observation reference system of
the type Ωn ×M(X)×M(Y) to be deﬁned? Such a question can only be answered in the
aﬃrmative if it is possible to specify the following:
1. n > 0 pairs (u, t),
2. p > 0 reference systems enabling the description of the initial conditions aﬀecting
the n pairs (u, t),
3. q > 0 reference systems enabling the description of states aﬀecting the n pairs
(u, t) according to the initial conditions in which they are found.
Specifying a descriptive reference system consists in identifying a ﬁnite set of mutually
exclusive values. Not all the description methods used in Psychology allow such a set to
be deﬁned; for example, a close examination of the so-called Exner scoring system (1995)
4Meehl (1967) noted several decades ago that the greater the `experimental precision', i.e. sample size,
the easier it is to corroborate the alternative hypothesis.
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for verbatims which may be collected for any Rorschach (1921) test card did not enable
us to determine the Cartesian product of the possible values. And yet, to ﬁnd a gap in
a reference system, this reference system must be constituted, so as to form a stabilised
and objective descriptive framework. Faced with such a situation, a knowledge historian
would be justiﬁed in describing a scientiﬁc era in which research is based on such a form of
descriptive methodology as being a pre-referential age.
With regard to the matter of the objectivity of a descriptive reference system, we shall
conﬁne ourselves to introducing the notion of score-objectivity. Let P = {pi, i = 1, . . . , z}
be a set of Psychologists and ωj ∈ Ω. (X, Y)i(ωj) is the value of ωj in M(X) ×M(Y)
as determined by the Psychologist pi. We may say that M(X) ×M(Y) is score-objective
relative to P if (X, Y)i(ωj) depends only on j for all values of j. If a descriptive reference
system is not score-objective, an event in Ω×M(X)×M(Y) which occurs in a gap cannot
categorically be interpreted as a falsifying observation, since it may depend on a particular
feature of the way the reporting Psychologist views it. Unless and until the descriptive
deﬁnition of an event is regulated in a score-objective manner, the nomothetic aspiration
appears to be premature, since it requires the objective world to be singular in nature.5
Only once a descriptive reference system has been identiﬁed may the knowledge historian
test its score-objectivity experimentally.
The historian might well discover that a ﬁeld of research is in fact associated with the
use of divergent description reference systems. Their task would then be to connect these
diﬀerent ﬁelds of reality by attempting to deﬁne the problem of the correspondence between
the impossibilities identiﬁed in the ﬁeld Ra and the impossibilities identiﬁed in the ﬁeld Rb
 which assumes such identiﬁcation is possible. Given a certain descriptive reference system
of cardinality c, the historian may evaluate its explorability and perhaps note that certain
description reference systems are inexplorable. Concerning explorable reference systems,
they could perhaps try to retrieve data collected during the course of empirical studies,
constitute an updated database, and seek nomothetic gaps in it.6
Let us now move on to the second point of this discussion. If the reference system
is explorable and assumed to be score-objective, it may be that each of its possible states
has been observed at least once. In this case, the descriptive reference system is sterile from
the nomothetic point of view and this constitutes a singular observation fact: everything
is possible therein. In other words, given an object in a certain initial state, nothing can
be asserted regarding its Y-state. This does not prevent the decision-making engineer from
wagering on the object's Y-state based on the distribution of Y-states, conditioned by the
initial conditions in which the object is found. These frequencies may be used to measure
'expectancies', but they do not form a basis on which to deduce the existence of a probability
function for these states. Indeed, deﬁning a random variableY orY|X requires the deﬁnition
of a probability space on the basis of the possible states M(X) ×M(Y). In order to be
probabilistic, such a space requires a probability space established on the basis of Ω (e.g.,
5We cannot simply classify the sources of score-subjectivity as measurement errors in the quantitative
domain (Stigler, 1986), since most descriptive reference systems in Psychology are qualitative; diverging
viewpoints for the same event described in a certain descriptive reference system represent an error, not of
measurement, but of deﬁnition.
6This type of database, established by merging several databases, has nothing to do with the aggregation
methodology of `meta-analyses' based on the use of statistical summaries (e.g., Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001).
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Renyi, 1966). Since Ω is a virtual set, adding objective probabilities to it is wishful thinking:
seeing (X, Y) as a pair of random variables constitutes an unfalsiﬁable interpretation.
Since such an interpretation is nonetheless of interest for making decisions, the existence
of a related law of probability being postulated, the probability of a given state may be
estimated on the basis of its frequency. The higher the total number of observations, the
more accurate this estimation will be, which is why a database established by bringing
together the existing databases is of interest. With the advent of the internet, recourse
to probabilistic mythology no longer requires the inferential machinery of null-hypotheses
testers to be deployed; it rather requires the empirical stabilisation of the parameters of the
mythical law.
We conclude this critical analysis with a reminder that scientiﬁc research in Psychology
is also aimed at the discovery of empirical laws. This requires two types of objectives to
be distinguished with care: practical objectives, which focus on decision amid uncertainty,
and nomothetic objectives, which focus on the detection of empirical impossibilities. Has
so-called scientiﬁc Psychology been able to discover any empirical laws, and if so, what are
they? From our contemporary standpoint, this question is easy to answer in principle  if
not in practice.
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